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 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2013  
SCHEDULE 1: CROWN USE    
Executive Summary 
 This submission relates to the proposed amendment of the Crown Use provisions in 
the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (“the Patents Act”),i which are contained in Intellectual Property 
Laws Amendment Bill 2013 (“The Bill”). Specifically, the submission relates to the 
method of calculation of the remuneration payable to the patent applicant/owner in 
circumstances where the Crown exercises its rights under Chapter 17 of the Patents 
Act.ii 
 The proposed amendments relating to the terms of the exploitation are 
described in Bill as ‘an amount of remuneration that is just and reasonable, having 
regard to the economic value of the exploitation of the invention.’iii Further, the 
exploitation as a general rule is to be on “reasonable terms”.iv 
 The proposals exacerbate a problem identified in one of the few cases where 
the Crown Use provisions have been considered.v Both the Patents Act as it presently 
stands and the proposed amendments do not impact the Court’s position that a 
royalty or licence fee is the method of calculation of the remuneration payable to a 
patentee, irrespective of the fact that the patentee itself may be exploiting the 
invention.  
In Stack, the patentee was actually exploiting the invention at the time when 
the instrumentality of the State, the Brisbane City Council (“the BCC”), sought to 
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exercise its rights under Chapter 17. In circumstances where a patentee is actually 
exploiting the invention (or about to exploit the invention), profit is lost and a licence 
fee or royalty basis for calculation of the remuneration under the Crown Use 
provisions is neither reasonable nor equitable.   
The position in Australia appears to be that regardless of whether the 
patentee is exploiting the patent and profiting from the exploitation, the 
remuneration is limited to a royalty rate, not the profits lost by the inability to 
exploit the invention by the exercise of the Crown Use rights. 
To add to this tension, the recent High Court decision in relation to plain 
packaging of cigarettes, identified that the acquisition of an interest in property 
“however slight or insubstantial it may be” under s 51(xxxi), must be on just terms. 
 
The Terms of Crown Use 
 The submission shall focus on the terms as they relate to the patent regime.  
 The Patents Act provides that at any time after a patent application has been 
made, where the Commonwealth or a State (or a person authorised in writing by the 
Commonwealth or a State) exploits the invention concerned for the services of the 
Commonwealth or the State, the exploitation is not an infringement.vi 
  The terms for the exploitation of the invention (including the remuneration 
payable) are such terms as are agreed between the relevant authority and the 
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patentee or, in the absence of agreement, as are determined by a prescribed court on 
the application of either party.vii This is largely unaffected by the Bill.viii 
In relation to patents, the provision will apply to the nominated person where 
the Crown exercises its rights under Chapter 17 in respect of a pending patent 
application.ix 
 Relevantly, the Patents Act does not provide any assistance to the court in 
relation to how such remuneration might be calculated. The Patents Act directs that 
the court may when fixing the terms take into account any compensation that a 
person interested in the invention or the patent has received, directly or indirectly, 
for the invention (or design) from the relevant authority.x  
 Without limiting the Court’s power to determine the remuneration payable in 
the absence of agreement between the parties, the Bill proposes that the Court must 
determine an amount of remuneration that is “just and reasonable, having regard to 
the economic value of the exploitation of the invention.”xi 
 The submission proposes that the Government considering adopting in the 
Patents Act an amendment such as that adopted in the United Kingdom in the late 
1980s, whereby in circumstances where the patent is exploiting or has taken steps to 
exploit the invention, the remuneration shall in that case, be on the basis of loss of 
profit. 
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Authority of the Commonwealth or State’ 
 It is helpful to briefly identify what entities are entitled to rely on the Crown 
Use provisions. 
 A reference in Chapter 17 of the Patents Act to the Commonwealth includes a 
reference to an authority of the Commonwealth and a reference to a State includes a 
reference to an authority of a State.  
 The question of what is an ‘authority of the State’ was examined in the case of 
Stack.xii Cooper J referred to two High Court decisions which considered the phrase 
‘authority of the State’. xiii  His Honour identified the following statements as 
compelling:xiv 
The words “authority of a State” naturally mean a body which is given by the State 
the power to direct or control the affairs of others on behalf of the State — ie, for the 
purposes of and in the interests of the community or some section of it.xv  
and further: 
In our opinion, the focus is upon government, and the function of government. If the 
appellant is to succeed, it must be because the proper conclusion, based on the 
legislation, is that the COD is not engaged in the work of government, 
notwithstanding that it is created a statutory authority with a wide range of 
powers.xvi 
 After considering the functions of the local authority, Cooper J determined 
that the BCC was an authority of the State: 
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The BCC is not a “third tier of government” provided for in the Federal Constitution. 
Rather, the BCC is a statutory body, established and ultimately controlled by State 
legislation. Its functions and powers are State governmental functions and powers, 
exercised in the interests of the community, which the State has delegated to it in 
legislation.xvii 
 
The method of calculation in Australia 
 The position in Australia appears to be that a licence fee approach to the 
method of calculation of remuneration payable the patentee or nominated person for 
Crown use is applicable.  
 There is no authority reported on the area. However, the patentee G.S. 
Technology Pty Limited (“GS Tech”) applied for the Court’s determination of the 
remuneration payable under Chapter 17 of the Patents Act, in relation to water meter 
assemblies protected by new patents derived from the original patent application in 
the Stack litigation.xviii  
On the second day of trial, the BCC applied orally to abandon the trial and 
sought directions for its rescheduling. During the submissions in that regard there 
was some preliminary discussion regarding the bases upon with the patentee sought 
remuneration.  
The patentee had supplied the BCC with the first tendered quantity of 
approximately 70,000 water meters and claimed remuneration under Chapter 17 in 
broad terms on a loss of profit basis.  
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The BCC however, submitted that the only basis upon which the patentee was 
entitled to remuneration under Chapter 17 was a licence fee approach and referred 
the primary judge Dowsett J, to an authority of the United Kingdom. 
The authority for the proposition that a licence fee approach was the only 
approach available in Crown Use cases, was the 1967 UK decision of Patchett’s 
Patent.xix His Honour, who had not at that stage of the remuneration application 
proceeding had the opportunity to consider Patchett’s Patent or any other relevant 
case carefully, said: 
…if after I’ve had an opportunity to consider the cases, when I’ve been 
referred to them, if I consider that Mr Vastaxx has pitched his case too high, I 
will let him know exactly what I think as I have on many other occasions 
where that has happened but I don’t think I can do it just at the moment and if 
I make it clear that, as it seems to me, the claim is inconsistent with the authorities 
and if for some reason people are not amenable to that suggestion, well we 
can reconsider the matter.xxi (Emphasis added) 
 The remuneration application settled during the course of the hearing on 
confidential terms. 
 In Patchett, Patchett, while employed by Sterling, invented a novel machine 
gun which he and his employer patented as co-patentees. An agreement between the 
parties provided that Patchett would receive a royalty of 2½% on any guns 
manufactured by Sterling, and that he would receive 40% of any sums realised by 
Sterling by the grant of licences.  
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Guns according to the patent were manufactured by the Crown in Royal 
Ordnance factories between 1956 and 1964. In 1956 Patchett brought a motion 
against the Crown for the determination of his rights to compensation for Crown 
Use of the invention. Subsequently in 1962 Sterling decided to bring a similar 
motion. Sterling claimed that they were entitled to additional compensation for loss 
of the manufacturing profit, which they could have reaped if guns made by the 
Crown in Royal Ordnance factories had been made by them.xxii 
At first instance, the trial judge accepted the contention that a patentee who 
was also a manufacturer and whose plant and manufacturing equipment had stood 
unused while his invention was exploited by the Crown might be able to claim 
additional compensation, but found on the facts that Sterling had failed to establish 
that they had the necessary manufacturing capacity at the relevant time.  
The Court of Appeal noted also that the trial judge had also found inter alia 
the appropriate royalty would be 5%. Patchett accepted the sum awarded to him by 
the court and was paid by the Crown, and was not represented at the appeal.  
On appeal by Sterling the Court of Appeal comprising Lord Justices Wilmer, 
Diplock and Winn considered that on the true construction of section 46 and the 
associated provisions of Crown use, a patentee was entitled only to compensation 
for Crown use of his invention, and therefore, whether he was a manufacturer or 
had idle manufacturing capacity was irrelevant. 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal was based substantially on the unique 
position of the Crown. The Court reasoned that a loss of expectation claim could be 
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made where the claim was made against an infringer. However the Crown, the court 
said was not an infringer – more so it had a right to the invention if it chose to 
exercise that right through the Crown Use provisions. Relevantly, Willmer LJ said at 
p246:  
I can deal briefly with the contention that Sterling are entitled to compensation for 
loss of the chance to manufacture these guns in their own factory, which I regard as 
wholly untenable. I do not accept the learned judge's view that a patentee's 
manufacturing interest is in any way relevant to the question what remuneration he 
should receive in respect of Crown user of his patent. The great mass of evidence 
which the learned judge heard with regard to Sterling's manufacturing capacity, I 
would regard as wholly irrelevant. A patentee who is to be remunerated under 
section 46 of the Act for the use of his invention may or may not be a manufacturer. 
But the section, as I read it, is concerned only with his rights as patentee, and not at 
all with his status as a manufacturer. It confers a right to remuneration for Crown 
user of the patent, but there is nothing in it to suggest that there is any right to 
compensation for loss of manufacture. Such a claim can well be put forward where 
there has been an infringement. But an infringement of patent is an actionable 
wrong, whereas user of a patent by the Crown is a matter of right specifically 
conferred by statute. Indeed the patentee's monopoly right is always subject to the 
Crown's right of user. The position of the Crown is much more analogous to that of 
a licensee, the difference being that whereas a licensee's right is normally acquired by 
agreement with the patentee, that of the Crown is conferred by statute. (Emphasis 
added) 
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 Lord Diplock approached the question from the perspective of the true nature 
of patent rights. They were not positive rights to exploit – an inventor already had 
that right. They were negative rights in the sense that the patentee could prevent 
others from exploiting the invention.xxiii His Honour said at p251: 
The rights of a patentee although controlled by the provisions of the Act have their 
origin in the royal grant of a monopoly contained in the patent and made under the 
prerogative powers of the Crown preserved by section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
(21 Jac. 1 cap. 3). The right conferred upon the patentee is a right to prevent other 
persons from using his invention; but at common law he had no right to prevent the 
Crown from doing so. 
 His Honour made reference to the non-infringing nature of the exercise of the 
Crown Use rights in these terms: 
The sum payable by the Government department is not compensation for an 
infringement by the Crown of the patentee's monopoly rights, for no infringement is 
involved. It is erroneous to regard a patentee as having an exclusive right to 
manufacture or permit the manufacture of the patented invention, for that is a right 
which is shared by the Crown. 
Lord Justice Winn also took the view that the patentee’s monopoly was 
subject to the rights of the Crown. His Honour said at p257: 
I have no doubt that the terms of remuneration or reward are to be assessed without 
having regard to any rights other than those comprised in the conditional monopoly 
granted to the patentee by his letters patent, i.e. a monopoly subject to the statutory 
rights of the Crown; it is quite irrelevant to the determination which the court is 
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called upon to make whether or not a patentee has himself embarked upon 
manufacture from which he is deriving and is anxious to continue to derive profit in 
the capacity of manufacturer. 
 Winn LJ made the observation that parliament had left the determination of 
proper remuneration to the discretion of the court: 
Whatever justification there may occasionally be in other contexts for complaining 
that courts sometimes exercise a type of "palm tree justice", it is clear that in this 
instance Parliament has enacted that the decision be left to the instinctive discretion 
of the court. 
In discussing the provision as to the amount of compensation under the 
Patents Act 1977 (UK) (“the UK 1977 Act”)xxiv payable to employees for their 
inventions, a leading commentary states that patentee’s position as manufacturer is 
not to be taken into account and that the patentee is only entitled to remuneration as 
patentee or inventor, not to remuneration as manufacturer.xxv 
 
Amendment of the UK position 
Recognising the need to pay proper and adequate compensation to inventors 
or their successors in title in cases where the Crown exercises its right to subsume 
the invention for its use, the UK 1977 Act, was amended in 1988 to add a provision, s 
57A, which required that in the case of the exercise of the Crown Use provisions, the 
remuneration was to be the loss of profit as a result of not being awarded the 
contract.xxvi 
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A copy of s 57A of the UK 1977 Act is set out in the Schedule hereto. It is 
submitted that only ss 57A(1) to 57A(4) are relevant to this submission, by reason 
that the remaining subsections are already accommodated in the Patents Act or are 
peculiar to the UK jurisdiction. 
Section 57A(1) of the UK 1977 Act relevantly provides states: 
“Where use is made of an invention for the services of the Crown, the 
government department concerned shall pay -  
(a) to the proprietor of the patent, or  
(b) if there is an exclusive licence in force in respect of the patent, to the 
exclusive licensee, compensation for any loss resulting from his not 
being awarded a contract to supply the patented product or, as the case 
may be, to perform the patented process or supply a thing made by 
means of the patented process.” 
A limitation was imposed to avoid situations where a patentee could not hope 
to supply the product or perform the process to order and yet seek compensation 
based on lost profit. In this regard the following provision was inserted:   
“57A(2) Compensation is payable only to the extent that such a 
contract could have been fulfilled from his existing manufacturing or 
other capacity; but is payable notwithstanding the existence of 
circumstances rendering him ineligible for the award of such a 
contract.xxvii 
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It was clearly UK parliament’s intention to encourage innovation and 
investment in research and development by crystallising the formerly undefined 
measure of remuneration and specifically stipulating that in certain cases loss of 
manufacturing profit was the appropriate measure.xxviii 
 
Tension within our law in Australia 
 The position in Australia, without legislative intervention, appears to be the 
position reflected in Patchett’s Patent, namely that the appropriate measure is a 
licence fee, irrespective of whether the patentee was manufacturing and supplying 
its patented product or performing its process in a commercial context. 
 Since 5 October 2012, that position has added to it, a further dimension calling 
for a more appropriate remuneration where the Crown has exercised its Crown Use 
rights.  
 On that date, the High Court delivered its reasons for the orders made 15 
August 2012 in favour of the Crown in the case of JT International.xxix In JT 
International tobacco companies JT International SA (JTI) and members of the British 
America Tobacco Group (BAT) commenced two proceedings which were heard in 
April 2012. The proceedings arose by reason of the implementation of the Tobacco 
Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (the TPP Act) which imposed significant restrictions 
upon the appearance of the packaging for tobacco products, specifically in relation to 
colour, shape and finish of retail product. Pre-existing regulatory requirements for 
health messages and graphic warnings remained in place. 
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The plaintiffs argued that the effect of the TPP Act was that their intellectual 
property rights and goodwill (specifically trade marks and copyright) had been 
acquired on other than just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.  
Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution relevantly provides: 
“The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws 
for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with 
respect to: 
the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for 
any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make 
laws;” 
The matters were heard together and orders were subsequently made on 15 
August 2012. The Court by majority (Heydon J dissenting), rejected the plaintiffs' 
case. The majority considered that there had been no acquisition of the plaintiffs' 
property within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. 
 
The High Court considered (by majority), that the TPP Act did not act as an 
acquisition within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. Their Honours of 
the majorityxxx referred to with approval the following statement of Mason J in The 
Commonwealth v Tasmania (The Tasmanian Dam Case),xxxi which identified that some 
property no matter how ‘insubstantial’ had to be acquired by the Commonwealth: 
To bring the constitutional provision into play it is not enough that legislation 
adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to 
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his property; there must be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or another 
acquires an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be. 
 It was fundamental to the reasoning of their Honours of the majority, that 
where there was a taking of rights, this did not necessarily amount to an acquisition 
for the purpose of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. Gummow J expressed it in these 
terms in relation to the question whether TPP Act effected an acquisition of the 
plaintiffs’ rights: 
This presents two questions. The first is whether there is a "taking" or "deprivation" 
of the property of the plaintiffs and, if so, the second question is whether the 
Packaging Act effects an "acquisition" of property otherwise than on just terms as 
proscribed by s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The distinction between the two 
questions appears from the pithy statement of Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and 
Dawson JJ to the effect that rights of property may be extinguished without being 
acquired.xxxii  
 
Comment  
The majority made clear that ‘acquisition’ by the Commonwealth within the 
meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, involved the receipt of something by the 
acquirer and that ‘[a]cquisition is therefore not made out by mere extinguishment of 
rights’: JT International per French CJ at [42].  
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That something was considered by the majority to involve an interest in 
property, however slight or insubstantial it may be.xxxiii Relevantly, Crennan J at [306] 
observed: 
… the Packaging Act restrictions, which effectively prohibit the plaintiffs from using 
their property for advertising or promotional purposes, while severe from a 
commercial viewpoint, do not operate so as to effect an acquisition of any proprietary right 
or interest by the Commonwealth…  
 
The exercise of the Crown Use provisions by the Commonwealth clearly does 
not act as an extinguishment of the patentee’s rights under the Patents Act. The rights 
are preserved in Chapter 17 and are subject to an agreement between the Crown and 
the patentee, or failing agreement, by assessment through the Court. They are 
simply not extinguished. 
Further it cannot be said in relation to the Crown Use rights, as was said in JT 
International, that the Crown does not acquire something of a proprietary nature. By 
example, with reference to Patchett’s Patent, the Crown acquired the machine guns.  
Although the Patents Act does not state that the remuneration payable should 
be a ‘reasonable’ one or a ‘fair’ one in the circumstances, s 51(xxxi) of the 
Constitution does preserve the rights of Australians where the Commonwealth does 
acquire property from the State or person, that such acquisition be on just terms. 
In circumstances where the Commonwealth exercises its rights against a 
patentee who is manufacturing the patented product (or utilising the patented 
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process commercially), it is respectfully submitted, that payment to the patentee 
based on a licence fee approach is not “on just terms”. 
Recommendation 
 The recommendation is to amend Chapter 17 of the Patents Act by the 
inclusion of a provision in similar terms to s 57A(1) to s 57A(4) of the UK 1977 Act. 
 
Dimitrios Eliades 
Barrister 
18 June 2013 
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     SCHEDULE 
 
57A Compensation for loss of profit. 
 
(1)Where use is made of an invention for the services of the Crown, the government 
department concerned shall pay— 
(a) to the proprietor of the patent, or 
(b) if there is an exclusive licence in force in respect of the patent, to the exclusive 
licensee, compensation for any loss resulting from his not being awarded a contract to 
supply the patented product or, as the case may be, to perform the patented process or 
supply a thing made by means of the patented process. 
(2) Compensation is payable only to the extent that such a contract could have been 
fulfilled from his existing manufacturing or other capacity; but is payable notwithstanding 
the existence of circumstances rendering him ineligible for the award of such a contract. 
(3) In determining the loss, regard shall be had to the profit which would have been 
made on such a contract and to the extent to which any manufacturing or other capacity was 
under-used. 
(4) No compensation is payable in respect of any failure to secure contracts to supply the 
patented product or, as the case may be, to perform the patented process or supply a thing 
made by means of the patented process, otherwise than for the services of the Crown. 
**(5) The amount payable shall, if not agreed between the proprietor or licensee and the 
government department concerned with the approval of the Treasury, be determined by the 
court on a reference under section 58, and is in addition to any amount payable under 
section 55 or 57. 
(6) In this section “the government department concerned”, in relation to any use of an 
invention for the services of the Crown, means the government department by whom or on 
whose authority the use was made. 
(7) In the application of this section to Northern Ireland, the reference in subsection (5) 
above to the Treasury shall, where the government department concerned is a department of 
the Government of Northern Ireland, be construed as a reference to the Department of 
Finance and Personnel. 
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** s 57A(5) to (7) are not considered relevant to the submission. 
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